This morning the MOJ and Israel PTO posted a call for suggestions for changes to the regulations governing patent oppositions in Israel, and the ILPTO sent out an email notifying recipients of this fact. The deadline for response is June 30, 2021. A similar call for comments was published in 2016, and while many comments were elicited (posted here), no action resulted. Apparently the powers-that-be now wish to move ahead with this.
I've blogged about patent oppositions in Israel before, but for those who aren't familiar with the opposition procedure, it goes roughly like this: the examiner says the application is allowable, the applicant pays an "acceptance" fee, and a notice that the application has been "accepted" is published in the Patents Journal. Any party then has three months to file an opposition to the grant of the patent, and then another three months to file its statement of case. The applicant then has three months to file its statement of case. Then the opposer has 3 months to file written evidence, the applicant has three months to file its evidence, and then the opposer can file further written evidence to address points raised in the applicant’s evidence. Then there’s an oral hearing at which the parties cross-examine witness, followed by written summations (oral summations are common in the USA but rarely used in any litigation in Israel). Eventually the Israel PTO issues a written decision, which is appealable to the district court. The whole process, without appeal, usually takes a minimum of two years, and in practice longer, since parties (or more accurately, their lawyers or patent agents) often agree to extensions. If the applicant wishes to amend its claims during the opposition, this can further prolong the proceedings. The applicant has no enforceable rights until it has a patent in hand, viz. until the ILPTO issues a decision upholding the grant of the patent.
One important point to note: the pre-grant oppositions are authorized by the statute, and thus can only be done away with, or modified to post-grant oppositions, by statutory amendment, which requires approval of the full Knesset. The particular rules governing the opposition procedure are set by regulation, which requires only approval of the relevant Knesset Committee and the Justice Minister, and therefore are a bit easier to adopt.
I reproduce below my own comments from November 2016, which explain many of the problems with the current system. My views haven’t changed in the interim, so I've yet to decide if I will change anything from what I wrote four-and-a-half years ago.
Shalom Ayelet.
I write in response to the “קול קורה” asking for comments on the opposition procedure in Israel. It’s not clear from the request itself if a change from pre-grant to post-grant opposition is going to be considered at this time, but I understand from other sources that the MOJ is interested in comments on making the existing opposition proceedings move along more quickly. So I’m not going to discuss pre- vs. post-grant oppositions, despite the fact that I think Israel should transition exclusively to a post-grant proceeding, and that it’s inefficient to not discuss such a transition at this time.
By way of background: I’m not being paid by anyone to write these comments. I deal primarily with helping inventive entities developing strategies for protecting their intellectual property, and I prepare and prosecute patent applications. I also have a fair amount of experience with oppositions from the side of patent applicants, in several fields, and I’ve worked on behalf of local generic pharmaceutical companies in assessing their positions, or potential positions, in view of pending applications. In short, I’ve seen the process from both sides, and I have no ulterior motive here: I call it like I see it, based on my experience.
A. It’s too easy to oppose
The single biggest problem I see with the existing opposition regime is that the barrier to entry for opponents is too low. This leads to the filing of unjustified oppositions and unnecessary prolongation of the patent grant process. To explain:
Presently, anyone has three months from the date of publication under section 26 to file a notice of opposition. They then have a period of an additional three months to file their pleadings (כתב טענות). Typically this document is a pro forma statement that “the claimed invention lacks utility under section 3, lack novelty under section 4 and lacks inventive step under section 5, the description is insufficient under section 12 and the claims do not reasonably arise from the specification under section 13”. The אגרה for filing a notice of opposition isn’t particularly high, and the attorney fees for preparing a one-page notice of opposition and a one-page כתב טענות are pretty low as well.
Thereafter, the applicant will file pro forma pleadings of its own within 3 months, denying the opponent’s contentions. This is supposed to be followed by written evidence from the opponent within 3 months. Often, however, at this stage, or sometimes even at the stage of the כתב טענות (!), the opponent will request an extension, and usually, the applicant will agree, because the applicant knows that it may later find itself in a situation in which it needs an extension, and therefore wants the opponent to be accommodating in the event that happens. This is even more true in situations in which the same two parties, represented by the same counsel, have multiple oppositions pending simultaneously, since acquiescence to an extension in one case can be traded for acquiescence to an extension for the other side in a different case.
If the opponent chooses not to file evidence, it can usually get the applicant to agree to have the opposition dismissed without a request for costs. More on that below.
The point here is that it is ridiculously easy for someone to oppose the grant of a patent application, and effectively delay the grant of the patent, at minimal cost to the opponent. This has to end, and a few changes in the procedure would achieve this result.
1. Require submission of detailed pleadings, and only allow amendment of those pleadings by leave of the Rasham with good cause.
In the old days, when Israel patent applications were only opened to the public upon completion of ex parte examination, there was some sense in giving opponents 3 months to decide whether or not to oppose, 3 months to file pleadings, and additional time to file written evidence. Not so anymore, with the examination file being open to the public 18 months after the priority date, or, more commonly, shortly after national phase entry. (The vast majority of patent applications filed in Israel are PCT national phase entries, and I assume that most of the oppositions are filed against national phase applications; I’ve no doubt the ILPTO has statistics on that.)
Today, interested parties can follow the examination for its duration. This means they can be ready not only with detailed pleadings, but with written evidence, very soon after the application has published. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to permit the submission of pro forma pleadings. At a minimum, opponents should be required to present their detailed pleadings, including complete lists of prior publications upon which they will be relying, at the time the pleadings are due. Frankly, I think they should be required to provide their evidence as well. Perhaps, instead of a three-month window to oppose, a 6-month window could be put in place, concomitantly with the requirement that opponents file their detailed pleadings and evidence. Note that this is similar to the existing rules governing cancellation actions (הליכי ביטול), in which the party seeking cancellation of a patent files pleadings at evidence at the same time.
Additionally, opponents should not be allowed to subsequently introduce or rely on publications or evidence that they could or should have known about at the time they filed their pleadings and evidence; when motioning to introduce new evidence, the opponent should need to show the rasham that the documents that the opponent seeks to introduce could not have been known to the opponent at the time it filed its pleadings and evidence.
The flip side of this, of course, is that the applicant would be required to file its response to the pleadings and evidence in a complete form within a similar, limited amount of time.
2. Require identification of the real party in interest, and introduce estoppel provisions
Currently, any party may oppose a patent application. Moreover, if that party loses the opposition, and the patent is granted, there is nothing in the statute to prevent that party from raising the same arguments as invalidity contentions in litigation, should that party be sued for infringement by the patentee. I don’t know if this has ever happened, and if it were to happen, there’s a chance the judge would agree with the patentee that the defendant is estopped from raising the same arguments after having lost at the PTO. But the fact is that it’s not in the statute. That’s unfortunate, because the risk of estoppel, when coupled with the requirement to submit complete pleadings and evidence at an early stage, would be one way to reduce the filing of frivolous oppositions.
Moreover, estoppel normally doesn’t apply to ostensibly unrelated parties that were not part of the prior proceeding – in this case, that were not part of the opposition.
What would be helpful, therefore, is to require identification of what in US law is called the real party in interest that is opposing the grant of the patent, and to statutorily introduce an estoppel against that party and any parties in privity with that party from raising in later court proceeding any arguments against the validity of the patent that could have been made (not just which were made, but could have been made) in the opposition proceeding.
3. Make it easier to reject oppositions out-of-hand (על הסף)
Opponents should be required to meet a minimum threshold, showing that the case they present goes beyond what was considered by the PTO during ex parte examination. If an opponent merely cites publications that, taken together, teach no more than the publications considered by the examiner during ex parte examination, then there’s no reason to proceed with the opposition. In such cases, the applicant should be able to have the opposition summarily dismissed. The rasham has traditionally been reluctant to use סילוק על הסף as means of disposing of cases before him; perhaps the statute should be amended to make it clear that this is an acceptable remedy when the opponent’s contentions amount to the same contentions considered by the examiner. This will also cause opponents to carefully consider the arguments to be made in an opposition.
4. Cap or eliminate cost awards
This is discussed in more detail below, but is mentioned here because this step would also reduce the likelihood of frivolous oppositions.
5. Increase the fee for filing oppositions
The usefulness of this step would seem to be self-evident, although if the changes outlined above are adopted, it might not be necessary.
B. Adopt an EPO-like procedure with respect to amendments
I once heard the late Eli Hurwitz say that there’s no patent that can’t be gotten around. It’s a well-taken point: no matter how worthy of patent protection an invention may be, it’s much more difficult to draft a good patent application than it is to invalidate a patent or oppose its grant. Moreover, the statute does not impose upon patent applicants a duty to search the prior art themselves before drafting their patent applications; rather, it assigns to the ILPTO the duty to determine the allowability of each of the claims of the patent application. It’s therefore not surprising that adverse parties will sometimes raise points that were not taken into consideration during ex parte examination.
In view of this asymmetry, if the application discloses something patentable but the claims do not define that something patentable sufficiently well, the applicant should be given the opportunity to amend its claims to a form in which the claims do define the invention so as to meet the requirements of the statute.
The present legal framework seeks to allow this, but is deficient in that it treats such amendments as separate proceedings in and of themselves. Moreover, while it correctly allows applicants to make such amendments as of right, if applicants find themselves having made one set of amendments, then find those amendments opposed by the opponent in the substantive opposition to the grant of the patent, the applicant may need to do another round of amendments. This obviously slows resolution of the opposition.
A more efficient route would be to adopt the type of approach taken by the EPO: after the parties have presented their arguments and evidence, when it comes time for the oral portion of the proceedings the applicant should be able to present a reasonable number of sets of claims, in its order of preference. Each set can then be considered by the PTO, with the opponent able to raise its objections, so that if there’s a set of claims that’s acceptable to the applicant and meets the statutory requirements, that fact will be discovered quickly.
C. Treat oppositions as private litigation
An irritating aspect of oppositions is that although they are designed as adversarial proceedings, the ILPTO often views its role as that of an inquisitor, whose job is to protect some amorphous, unidentified “public” from an invalid claims in patents. That view, which is biased against patent applicants, evinces a misunderstanding of the ILPTO’s role. The ILPTO’s role is to examine patent applications, to refuse to allow claims that are not new or are obvious over prior publications, or are insufficiently supported by the specification – i.e. that don’t meet the requirements of sections 4, 5, 12 and 13 of the statute – and to allow claims that do meet those requirements. That’s how innovation is encouraged.
To the extent that pre-grant opposition is viewed as an extension of patent prosecution, the scales should not be tipped against applicants whose applications happen to have been opposed by third parties, as is presently the case, with the ILPTO assuming a quasi-inquisitorial stance. Rather, the opposition should be treated as private litigation. If the opponent has not raised an argument, then it’s not for the patent office to raise that argument for the opponent. Similarly, if the parties submit a mutually-agreed upon request to an extension for one of the sides to file some paper, this should be granted by the rasham.
D. Eliminate failure to cite prior publications as a ground for oppositions
The statute rightly imposes on applicants a duty to assist the PTO by informing the PTO of publications cited against corresponding applications elsewhere or that are otherwise known to the applicant to be relevant. However, failure to cite a reference should not per se be grounds for invalidating a patent; such failure should only matter when (a) but for (אלמלא) the omission, the examiner would not have allowed the claims in the form in which they were allowed, and (b) the omission was deliberate, with an intent to deceive the PTO. While the PTO can readily determine (a), it is in a poor position to determine (b), a task more suited to the courts. Consequently, failure to comply with section 18 should be removed as a grounds for opposition.
E. Cap or eliminate cost awards
In the last several years the PTO has gone absolutely berserk in its awards of costs to the prevailing party in inter partes proceedings, granting awards that are far beyond what a party could obtain from a judge in a regular court proceeding. Applicants for patents should not be punished for unsuccessfully seeking patent protection, and opponents should not enjoy a windfall for convincing the rasham to sustain an opposition; in most instances, if an opponent is successful, the opposition has paved the way to commercial success that will far exceed what it spent on the opposition.
Since the PTO seems to be unable to restrain its predilection for cost awards out of proportion to cost awards in litigation before the courts, it’s time to statutorily reign in such costs. Or to do away with them altogether, since for most opponents the cost of the opposition is merely part of the cost of doing business – many of the same parties that regularly file oppositions today were filing them regularly 20 years ago as well, before the PTO starting enriching those parties for having filed those oppositions, which means in the past they really did view it as part of the cost of doing business. Granting windfalls in the form of cost awards distorts the system.
I’d be happy to discuss these matters, and other points related to oppositions, with you or members of the MOJ staff.
Dan Feigelson
November 15, 2016
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