This is longish post, prompted by a comment made by Dennis Crouch at his PatentlyO blog. Since much of it deals with the background of the Hatch-Waxman amendment, with which some readers are familiar, I’ll cut to the chase: in discussing the recent CAFC decision in Valeant v Mylan, Dennis suggested that there may be a first amendment issue lurking in the fact that 35 USC §271(e) says it’s an act of patent infringement to submit a paragraph IV ANDA to the FDA. He thinks this might be an infringement of the constitutional right to petition the government and the right to free speech, both enshrined in the First Amendment of the US Constitution. I think that suggestion is baloney.
By way of background: Hatch-Waxman is the 1984 US law (which amended both the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act and the Patent statute) that was a boon for both drug innovation and for the generic drug industry. Until that time, a generic drug manufacturer (“GDM”) had to wait until a patent (or patents) expired before even undertaking experiments to begin manufacturing a patented drug, including experiment to obtain data to be submitting to the FDA in support of the request for approval of the generic drug. Under H-W, prior to patent expiration those generic drug manufacturers can do almost everything necessary to bring the product to market. GDMs can thus seek FDA approval for their drugs prior to patent expiration, so that they can be ready to go to market as soon as the patents expire. (H-W also instituted a tightly circumscribed mechanism for limited patent term extension for drug patents, but that’s not germane to the present discussion.)
Additionally, instead of replicating all of the (time consuming and expensive) clinical work of the originator, it’s sufficient for a GDM to show that its generic drug is bioequivalent to an approved drug. The GDM can thus submit an “abbreviated new drug application”, aka an ANDA, to the FDA.
Under H-W, patentees submit to the FDA lists of patents that cover their approved drugs; the FDA compiles these in a publication commonly referred to as “the Orange Book”. When filing an ANDA, a GDM must make a certification with respect to the patent status of the drug. The GDM may certify that there are no relevant patents in the Orange Book, or that there are patents but the GDM will not market the drug until after those patent expire.
But H-W includes a provision to encourage challenges to patents, or to encourage companies to work around patents, in order to get generics to market earlier (and thus reduce drug prices): the ANDA filer may certify that there are patents, but that those patents are invalid and/or not infringed. Under H-W, the submission of an ANDA containing such a certification, known as a “paragraph IV” certification, constitutes an act of infringement (as codified at 35 USC §271(e)), and if the patentee sues the ANDA filer for infringement within 45 of being notified of the ANDA filing, the FDA is precluded from examining the ANDA submission for 30 months. But the first ANDA filer that is successful in its challenge gets 180 days of exclusivity vis-à-vis other GDMs.
ANDA litigation is somewhat anomalous, in that it’s only the submission of the ANDA with the paragraph IV certification that constitutes infringement – no actual infringement has taken place, because, in the absence of FDA approval, no product has yet been sold or put on the market. So in the case of ANDA litigation, the patent infringement/validity question is normally resolved before any traditional infringement has taken place, the GDM is thus not potentially on the hook for a large damage award since the patentee hasn’t suffered an actual injury, and usually the public gets lower-cost generic drugs at an earlier stage than it would have in the pre-H-W era.
So much for a run-down of the Hatch-Waxman regime. If you’ve hung with me for this long, you’re surely asking, “What does all of this have to do with free speech?” In my view, nothing, but last week, in discussing the CAFC’s, Valeant v Mylan decision, Dennis Crouch suggested it does.
The Valeant decision actually focused on something completely different, namely the question of the proper venue for entertaining an ANDA infringement suit, following the Supreme Court’s 2017 TC Heartland decision. That question boils down to where the act of infringement occurred or where the defedant’s place of business is located. The court held that in this case, since the ANDA was submitted from Mylan’s headquarters in West Virginia, that’s where the act of infringement occurred, and so venue was proper in WV, not in New Jersey where the suit had been filed. But in discussing the case, Dennis Crouch, a law professor and blogger, suggested that by defining a paragraph IV ANDA submission as constituting infringement, 271(e) might run afoul of the First Amendment, stating
“There has been some debate about the how to think about §271(e). It seems odd that “to petition the Government” constitutes an act of infringement. (Quoting the First Amendment, U.S. Const.).”
and then going on to write,
“Although I have not developed this argument, the court’s straight-read of the statute here places the provision on rocky First Amendment grounds regarding both speech and gov’t petitions. The court considered some of these issues in the personal-jurisdiction context in Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 173 F.3d 829 (Fed. Cir. 1999)”
I find both assertions puzzling, and the first one to be misleading. The First amendment reads,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
As an initial matter, the FA guarantees the right to petition for the redress of grievances. An ANDA filing can probably reasonably be construed as a petition, but it is not a petition for a redress of a grievance. It is a petition that is entirely the result of federal legislation. The FDCA creates something called an ANDA, and 35 USC §271(e) doesn’t curtail the ability to do that. Indeed, as I explained above, the relevant provisions of both the FDCA and the Patent Statute were enacted simultaneously, as part of a single package, with the passage of the Hatch-Waxman amendment. To paraphrase, all that 35 USC §271(e) says is, “The FDCA allows GDMs to try to piggyback on the work done by others, by filing something called an ANDA; but understand that such a filing, under certain circumstances, may constitute patent infringement.” Indeed, H-W was designed to encourage paragraph IV challenges and the ensuing litigation, as a means of getting generic drugs to market more quickly. So no right to petition is curtailed by 35 USC §271(e), let alone a right to petition “for redress of grievances”. That aspect of the First Amendment is not implicated by the H-W scheme.
Additionally, no speech is being prohibited or curtailed by 35 USC §271(e). GDMs can file their ANDAs, and say whatever they want. It might be imprudent for them to say something like, “We actually think the patents we’re challenging are valid and infringed” in a shareholder report, but a GDM is still free to say so, even as it files its ANDA asserting that those patents invalid and/or not infringed.
As noted, the filing of an ANDA is only defined as an act of infringement if it includes a paragraph IV certification. The ANDA filer can choose not to go to market until after the patents expire, in which case the ANDA filing doesn’t constitute infringement. If the ANDA filer makes a paragraph IV certification, the patentee may choose not to sue for infringement, in which case the FDA will process the ANDA, without the 30-month stay. And in the worst case scenario, there’s litigation and the ANDA submission is found to constitute infringement, in which case, as noted, there are no damages (since there’s no FDA approval and nothing has been sold), and the ANDA filer merely needs to wait until the patents have expired.
Of course, the GDM has the option of foregoing the ANDA route and instead developing its own data and submitting that as a regular NDA rather than an ANDA, in which 35 USC §271(e) wouldn’t come into play.
Moreover, the ANDA filer has benefited from the safe harbor of Hatch-Waxman, which says that doing the acts necessary to compile the data for the ANDA submission (e.g. synthesizing the active molecule) *doesn’t* constitute infringement, even though those acts normally *would* constitute infringement.
Finally, there’s no criminal penalty attached to a paragraph IV ANDA filing – the remedies for patent infringement are civil.
In short, I don’t see where there are any first amendment issues here – neither from the free speech aspect, nor from the right to petition aspect.
The sheer inanity of the suggestion that 35 USC §271(e) might not pass constitutional muster is brought into sharp relief when one consider the alternatives to the present arrangement under H-W. One alternative is the pre-Hatch-Waxman arrangement, under which the acts necessary to prepare an FDA submission constitute infringement, and thus competitors need to wait until the patents expire before even beginning to prepare generics – or they need to send such work offshore, to a country where such acts don’t constitute infringement. This is where we would be if the Supreme Court were to strike down the entirety of Hatch-Waxman as unconstitutional.
Another alternative is to provide the safe harbor of H-W, but without stipulating that submitting an ANDA to the FDA constitutes infringement. Then the ANDA filer may get FDA approval, but then will have to decide whether or not to launch “at risk”. And if, as is likely an, infringement suit follows, the patentee’s ability to obtain an injunction is uncertain, and the ANDA filer may be subject to a damage award if it does launch at risk. This would be the situation that would result were the Supreme Court to decide that the provisions of Hatch-Waxman are severable (severability being on many lawyers’ minds this week in the wake of arguments about Obamacare before the Supreme Court in California v Texas), and that §271(e) specifically is unconstitutional.
It doesn’t appear to me that either of those alternatives is better than the present system under H-W. Indeed, I think Hatch-Waxman is one of the few pieces of federal legislation that actually accomplished what it set out to accomplish and serves the public well. Would it be worth it to the public to jettison the present H-W system on the basis of a specious First Amendment argument? In this connection, see Judge Gajarsa’s discussion in Zeneca v Mylan that Dennis mentioned on this point.
Bottom line: there’s no First Amendment issue with 35 USC §271(e), and it’s pity that this suggestion was made by Dennis in his blog.
Recent Comments